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Stay Tuned for New Technology: The
Paradoxes of the Proposed Financial
Interest and Syndication Rules
by ELI H. GLOVINSKY*
I
Introduction
Historically, federal regulation of television has been marked
by complexity and confusion. This fact is, perhaps, nowhere
more apparent than in the current issues and controversy sur-
rounding the "tentative" repeal of the financial interest and
syndication rules by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC). The rules, which were promulgated by the FCC in
1970, effectively prohibit the "big three" television networks1
* Member, Second Year Class; B.A., University of California at Los Angeles,
1982.
1. The three major networks, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS), are, in essence, distribution companies. They distribute television programs
over telephone lines and via satellite to individual affiliated stations. In addition, each
network owns and operates several stations in major markets. Networks obtain their
revenue from advertisers who pay a certain rate to have commercials broadcast. W.
JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 146-48 (2d ed. 1979). Other
privately owned stations can contract with one of the major networks in order to re-
ceive that particular network's programming and thus become a network affiliate. As
an affiliate, a local station can choose not to exhibit network programs, yet affiliates
typically air 95% of the networks' offerings because first, they receive
direct compensation from the network equal to approximately 30% of the sta-
tion's advertising rate (fixed by negotiation between the station and the net-
work) after carrying approximately 20 to 25 hours of network programming
each month without compensation. Second, the station can sell advertising
time at the "station breaks" to non-network advertisers; the value of this time
is enhanced by the popularity of the network's programming. Third, if the net-
work's programs attract large audiences, there may be a tendency for such
audiences to remain tuned to the station for non-network programming or to
identify the station as one which generally carries popular programming; this
enhances the audiences and advertising rates for the station's non-network
programs.
Id. at 147.
Independent stations are those that are not owned by, or affiliated with, a major net-
work. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 440 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
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from either acquiring financial interests in independently pro-
duced programs or participating in the lucrative after-market
of syndicated network entertainment series. 2
The involvement of two powerful groups, one opposing re-
peal, the other advocating it, has intensified the controversy.
In one corner are the networks, who see repeal as an opportu-
nity to share in the profits from syndication.' Opposing the
networks is the Committee for Prudent Deregulation (CPD), a
coalition of independent producers, independent television
stations, television performers, program directors, writers, syn-
dicators, and distributors4 favoring retention of the rules which
have helped them to prosper.
2. The financial interest rule provides that no network shall:
acquire any financial or proprietary right or interest in the exhibition, distribu-
tion, or other commercial use of any television program produced wholly or in
part by a person other than such television network, except the license or
other exclusive right to network exhibition within the United States and on
foreign stations regularly included within such television network.
47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1) (ii) (1983).
The syndication rule provides that no network shall:
sell, license, or distribute television programs to television station licensees
within the United States for non-network television exhibition or otherwise
engage in the business commonly known as "syndication" within the United
States; or sell, license, or distribute television programs of which it is not the
sole producer for exhibition outside the United States; or reserve any option
or right to share in revenues or profits in connection with such domestic and/
or foreign sale, license, or distribution.
47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1) (i) (1983).
3. The syndication market has been estimated to be worth from $800 million to
$1.2 billion a year. Shaw, Networks, Hollywood Battle Over Rights, The Record, Oct. 25,
1983, at 10, col. 3.
4. In re Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j), The Syndication and Financial Inter-
est Rule, Comments of the Committee for Prudent Deregulation in BC Docket No. 82-
345, at 1 (Jan. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as CPD Comments]. Prominent members of
the CPD include Norman Lear's Embassy/Tandem Productions, MTM Enterprises,
Cox Communications, and Lorimar Productions.
5. The networks rarely produce entertainment series. This fact is, in part, a re-
sult of their respective consent decrees with the Department of Justice which allow
them to produce only a limited number of programs through their own "in-house" pro-
duction resources. See, e.g., infra note 55 and accompanying text.
Thus, the vast majority of entertainment series are produced by independent pro-
duction companies such as MTM or film studios such as Twentieth Century Fox. In-
dependent producers, under the rules, own financial and syndication rights to the
programs they produce. Ownership of syndication rights allows independent produ-
cers to profit from the sale of exhibition rights after the program's network run. The
networks, while often overseeing the development process of a series from concept to
the one-time production of a trial episode (a pilot), pay producers a set license fee in
exchange for the exclusive right to exhibit the program a certain number of times. The
networks' ownership interest is limited to such exclusive exhibition rights. Producers
contend that network license fees typically do not cover the cost of production. Thus,
PARADOXES OF THE PROPOSED RULES
The debate over the proposed repeal of the financial interest
and syndication rules has given rise to a variety of issues
which, under close analysis, present four striking paradoxes.
First, although the FCC's underlying policy goal throughout its
regulatory history has been to encourage diversity, its initial
allocation of the television spectrum in 1952 virtually guaran-
teed the development of only three successful commercial tele-
vision networks.6 Second, the networks, while contending that
competition from new video technologies such as cable televi-
sion has eroded their share of the television viewing audience,
at the same time admit that their dominant position will re-
main secure into the 1990's.7 If such admissions are true, de-
regulation, which in this instance means repeal of the rules,
would achieve a contradictory result as far as the FCC policy
goal of diversity is concerned. In short, repeal might help the
networks to solidify their control over the television industry
by weakening the financial and political clout of independent
producers, an existing check on network power.
The third paradox is evident in the networks' reaction to
competition from new video sources. Although the networks
claim that this competition justifies repeal of the rules, they
are, in fact, major investors in such new sources. 8 In essence,
the networks' appeal can be viewed as a cry to "save them from
themselves."9
Finally, under the banner of deregulation, the FCC's current
chairman, Mark S. Fowler, is the driving force behind the
movement to repeal the rules.10 Yet President Reagan, who ap-
pointed Fowler and consistently espouses the values of gov-
they rely on the profits from syndication in order to remain financially strong. Amend-
ment of Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Tentative Decision and Request for
Further Comments in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 83-377, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,020, paras. 2-6
(adopted Aug. 4,1983) (hereinafter cited as Tentative Decision]. See also 2 FCC NET-
WORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, BACKGROUND REPORTS To: NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS:
ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 319-439 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
BACKGROUND REPORTS].
6. BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 74.
7. Amendment of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest Rule, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959,
32,967 (adopted June 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Proposed Rule Making].
8. In re Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j), The Syndication and Financial Inter-
est Rule, Reply Comments of the Committee for Prudent Deregulation in BC Docket
No. 82-435, at 29 (Apr. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as CPD Reply Comments].
9. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 156.
10. Networks Win Financial Interest, Syndication Battle, BROADCASTING, Aug. 8,
1983, at 28.
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ernment nonintervention, has advocated retention of the rules
for at least two more years."
This note analyzes the apparent irony surrounding the tenta-
tive repeal of the rules and attempts to demonstrate that re-
peal at the present time would achieve an unintended result: a
less diverse television industry. Since it is important to under-
stand the historical context underlying the present contro-
versy, this note begins with a discussion of the development of
FCC policy leading to the adoption of the rules in question. It
then focuses on the current marketplace and the impact of new
entertainment and information media. Based on the current
video marketplace and future projections, the note concludes
by suggesting that, in the absence of a viable network/pro-
ducer compromise concerning financial and syndication rights,
the present rules should be left intact.
II
Historical Background
A. The Policy of Diversity
Section 151 of the Communications Act of 1934 established
the FCC as a federal agency and empowered it to enforce other
provisions of the Act.' 2 The operative language most often
cited as defining standards for FCC regulation provides that
the Commission must promote the standard of "public conven-
ience, interest, or necessity.' 3 One commentator points out
that the exact parameters of "public interest" were left inten-
tionally undefined to allow the standard to be applied flexibly
to changing circumstances. 4 The FCC recognizes, however,
that the public interest standard is most effectively advanced if
regulation is based on a policy of encouraging diversity and
competition. 15 In the Commission's view, the public interest
standard embodies two basic principles: "(1) promoting the di-
versification of programming sources and viewpoints (diver-
sity) and (2) encouraging competition in broadcasting
(economic efficiency)."' 6 In effect, "[d]iversity has been the
11. Ganging Up on the Networks Re Fin-Syn, BROADCASTING, Nov. 7, 1983, at 31.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
13. Id. § 303.
14. S. PERLMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELECTED ISSUES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4
(1970).
15. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 102..
16. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 84.
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lynchpin of many Commission actions for nearly fifty years."' 7
The United States Supreme Court, based on its interpreta-
tion of the Act, has recognized the expansive power of the FCC
to advance the public interest through policies designed to
achieve a competitive and diverse marketplace.18 Further-
more, in many other areas of economic regulation the Court
itself has encouraged diversity and competition. For example,
in a landmark antitrust decision, Northern Pacific Railway Co.
v. United States, 9 the Court reaffirmed its belief in the value of
a competitive and diverse marketplace. The Court cited this
policy as deriving from "the premise that the unrestrained in-
teraction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time pro-
viding an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.""
B. Spectrum Allocation
In 1945, the FCC grappled with the question of how to allo-
cate the available frequency spectrum,2' taking into account
the recent emergence of television.22 An important considera-
tion was whether to assign stations to the ultra high frequency
(UHF) 23 spectrum or the very high frequency (VHF)24 spec-
trum.25 Radio Corporation of American (RCA) had developed a
television receiver designed to receive VHF signals and thus
pressed the Commission to assign the VHF spectrum.26 Co-
17. Id.
18. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
19. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Most of the frequency spectrum is invisible. It encompasses light, sound, and
radio waves. Such waves are disturbances which travel through space like the ripples
created by a raindrop in a still pond. Waves are classified by the distance from crest to
crest (wavelength) and the number of these crests which occur per second (cycles per
second). The portion of the spectrum reserved for broadcast television includes the
very high frequency (VHF) spectrum, found between 54 and 300 million cycles per
second (megahertz or MHz), and the ultra high frequency (UHF) spectrum, located
between 470 and 806 MHz. The VHF band includes television channels 2-13 while UHF
includes channels 14-69. It is important to recognize that the spectrum is a finite natu-
ral resource with limited capacity. Lachenbruch, A Field Guide to the Airwaves,
CHANNELS FIELD GUIDE '84, 1983, at 47.
22. BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 69.
23. See supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 69-70.
26. Id. at 69.
No. 31
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lumbia Broadcasting System (CBS), on the other hand, urged
allocation of the UHF spectrum because CBS Laboratories had
developed a color receiver which operated only on UHF.27 The
FCC struck what it saw as a compromise and in its initial allo-
cation assigned frequencies from the VHF spectrum, while at
the same time determined that television would ultimately use
the UHF band because it provided more room for expansion.2 8
In 1952, the FCC finalized its frequency assignments in its
Sixth Report and Order.2" This final allocation insured the ini-
tial development of only two networks, the National Broadcast-
ing Company (NBC) and CBS. 0 According to the CPD:
This result was ordained by the combination of (1) the eco-
nomic fact that a successful national television network
needed access to at least the 50 largest cities in the country;
(2) the technical fact that the development of VHF television
was far ahead of UHF both in terms of transmission equipment
and numbers of receivers possessed by consumers; and
(3) the regulatory fact that the Sixth Report had assigned more
than two VHF outlets in only 27 of the top 50 markets.3'
Another important factor contributing to the initial preemi-
nence of only two networks was that the two major radio net-
works, NBC and CBS, were able to extend their radio networks
into the television medium.32 During the late 1930's, the two
radio networks, using their networking experience, began
plans for expansion into television.3 3 Later, as television sta-
tions went on the air, network radio affiliates often became tel-
evision affiliates, network radio programs were transformed
into television programs, and radio advertisers began advertis-
ing on television. 4
In a sense, the Sixth Report represents a regulatory paradox.
The FCC's allocation under the Sixth Report directly contra-
27. Id. at 70.
28. Id. See also STERLING & KITTROSS, STAY TUNED: A CONCISE HISTORY OF AMERI-
CAN BROADCASTING 233 (1978).
29. Television Assignments, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
30. BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 74. ABC, although involved in the de-
velopment of television networking, experienced great financial difficulties in its early
years. The 1952 spectrum allocation impaired ABC's ability to acquire new advertisers
and affiliates. Thus, "[ilt took ABC television 25 years to reach competitive parity with
NBC and CBS." Id. at 88.
31. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 10.
32. BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 75.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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dicted the Commission's long sought goal of diversity by assur-
ing the initial emergence of only two national networks.
During the next thirty years, the FCC would attempt to rectify
many of the problems created by its 1952 allocation.
C. Subsequent Regulation
1. FCC
As early as 1938, the Commission began investigating possi-
ble regulatory schemes for radio networks.3 Some of these
schemes, although first applied to radio, were later extended to
television.36 During the late 1950's, Congress and the Depart-
ment of Justice supplemented the work of the FCC by con-
ducting additional investigations into the rapidly emerging
television industry. 7
The present financial interest and syndication rules had
their beginnings in a 1959 FCC Order for an Investigatory Pro-
ceeding (Order).38 The proceeding was designed to inquire
into various aspects of television programming including own-
35. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 12.
36. Id. at 13.
37. In 1956, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, after
holding hearings on issues pertinent to the television industry, concluded:
There can be no doubt . . . that the networks occupy such a key position by
virtue of their control over the best time in the key markets, that they have the
power either to exclude independently produced programs from their sched-
ules, thus making way for their own programs, or to give such programs access
to network time only in return for the granting oi an interest in the independ-
ent programs.
CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 19 (quoting STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85Tm CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON TELEVISION NETWORK
PRACTICES 66 (Comm. Print 1957)).
The House Antitrust Subcommittee reached similar conclusions. As a result, sev-
eral bills were introduced "to provide for various levels of network regulation." CPD
Comments, supra note 4, at 20. In 1956, the Department of Justice also began an inves-
tigation into network television, focusing on possible antitrust violations by the net-
works. Id. at 21.
38. In Docket No. 12782, 24 Fed. Reg. 1605 (adopted Feb. 26, 1959). A 1957 FCC doc-
ument called The Barrow Report culminated an earlier inquiry into network television.
The 1957 report "established the relationship between the networks' control of station
broadcasting time and the inability of independent producers to supply programming
in competition with that owned or produced by the networks." CPD Comments, supra
note 4, at 14. Soon after The Barrow Report was released, the FCC also established the
Office of Network Study, which, in 1962, concluded in its Second Interim Report that
"the high hopes ... that 'competition' would decentralize the 'tremendous power' of
networks over what the public may see or hear has not, as yet, been realized in televi-
sion network operations." Id. at 16 (quoting FCC OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, TELEVI-
SION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT (1962), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-10 (1963)).
COMM/ENT L. J.
ership, production, acquisition, distribution, selection, sale,
and licensing. 9 It focused on the extent to which the networks
controlled programming.' Based on the information gathered
during the investigation prompted by the 1959 Order, the Com-
mission, in its 1965 Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Notice),
outlined certain rules, including the present financial interest
and syndication rules, which were "designed to correct a per-
ceived competitive imbalance in program production and dis-
tribution industries."'" The Commission determined that the
networks had
adopted and pursued practices in television program procure-
ment and production through which they have progressively
achieved virtual domination of television program markets.
The result is that the three national network corporations not
only in large measure determine what the American people
may see or hear during the hours when most Americans view
television but also would appear to have unnecessarily and un-
duly foreclosed access to other sources of programs.42
The FCC also determined that the networks often required
producers to cede valuable syndication and financial interest
rights as a condition of exhibition.43 The Commission con-
cluded that undue control by networks over programming was
undesirable because "diversification of economic interest and
power in this area is a cardinal principle of the public interest
standard of the Communications Act."
As a result of the concerns expressed in the 1965 Notice, the
FCC adopted the financial interest and syndication rules in
1970.45 The Commission asserted that "[t] he public interest re-
39. Order for an Investigatory Proceeding in Docket No. 12782, 24 Fed. Reg. 1605
(adopted Feb. 26, 1959).
40. Id.
41. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 15 (citing Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 45 F.C.C. 2146 (1965)).
42. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, 45 F.C.C. 2146, para. 4 (1965).
43. Id. at para. 25.
44. Id.
45. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Re-
port and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970). The Prime Time Access Rule, which was
adopted at the same time as the financial interest and syndication rules but is not
included in the tentative repeal, prohibits television stations from exhibiting more
than three hours of network and off-network programs (network re-runs) during the
7:00-11:00 p.m. prime time period. Id. at para. 5.
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quires limitation on network control and an increase in the op-
portunity for development of truly independent sources of
prime time programming."46 In a Memorandum Opinion and
Order affirming the rules, the FCC explained:
[T]he principal purposes of our new syndication rules are two:
(1) to lessen the bargaining leverage provided by network con-
trol of program exhibition on most stations throughout the
country which enables networks successfully to bargain for
subsidiary rights and interests with producers, and (2) to re-
move the possibility that acquisition of such rights becomes a
prerequisite to acceptance of a program for network
exhibition.47
Based on the contention that they violated free speech and
the first amendment, the rules were challenged unsuccessfully
in Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC.48 Quoting the
landmark decision of Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,"9 the
court in Mt. Mansfield asserted that "the First Amendment
confers no right on licensees. . . to an unconditional monopoly
of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others
the right to use. '50 The Mt. Mansfield court also reaffirmed the
Commission's expansive powers to regulate in the public
interest.51
2. Department of Justice
Other administrative agencies in addition to the FCC be-
came interested in network practices. In 1972, after several
years of investigation of possible network violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Department of Justice filed anti-
trust suits against each of the three networks.52 In its suit
against NBC, the Justice Department alleged that the network,
along with CBS and the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC), was attempting to acquire a monopoly over the televi-
46. Id. at para. 22.
47. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 318, para. 29 (1970).
48. 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
49. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
50. Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 447 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391).
51. Id. at 480.
52. The suits were dismissed on procedural grounds but were refiled in 1974. CPD
Comments, supra note 4, at 31.
No. 31
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sion programming market. 3 Such actions, the Justice Depart-
ment claimed, concentrated ownership and control of prime
time television programs and unreasonably restrained the pro-
duction, distribution, and sale of television programs. It con-
cluded that "the viewing public has been deprived of the
benefit of free and open competition in the broadcasting of tel-
evision entertainment programs. '5 4
NBC was the first network to settle the antitrust suit brought
by the Justice Department. The network agreed to abide by a
consent decree designed to restrict many of its alleged anti-
trust violations. Among the provisions of the consent decree,
effective until 1990, are financial interest and syndication rules
virtually identical to the 1970 FCC rules, a limitation on inter-
nal, in-house production by the network,55 and a variety of
other restrictions dealing with everything from options to ex-
clusivity rights.56
Interestingly enough, only the court appeared satisfied with
the NBC consent decree. Both independent producers and the
networks objected to its terms.57 The producers claimed that
the networks should not be allowed any in-house production of
programs, claiming that the networks could threaten expan-
sion of such internal production in order to acquire more
favorable terms in their dealings with independent produ-
cers.58 The networks argued that the decree was anti-competi-
tive because it would shield independent producers from
competition by the networks as program producers.59
Although NBC entered into its consent decree in 1973, CBS
and ABC did not agree to similar decrees until 1980.60 CBS and
ABC obtained what they considered to be important modifica-
tions of the original NBC decree before they would agree to
settle. Because of a "favored-nations" clause in the NBC and
53. United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
54. Id. at 1130-31.
55. The decree allowed NBC to produce 2.5 hours of in-house programming per
week. Id. at 1131.
56. Id. at 1131-34.
57. Id. at 1138-40.
58. Id. at 1135-38.
59. Id. at 1138-40.
60. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Civ. No. 74-3599-RJK (C.D. Cal.
July 3,1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 34,463 (1980); United States v. American Broad-
casting Co., Civ. No. 74-3600-RJK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg.
58,441 (1980).
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CBS decrees which allowed the modifications acquired by
each network to apply to the others as well, the "improve-
ments" in the decrees negotiated by ABC and CBS were em-
bodied in the decrees of all three networks."
D. Reconsideration of the Rules
In 1977, the FCC began its most recent inquiry into network
television. 2 This inquiry focused primarily on the relation-
ships between the networks and their affiliate stations and on
whether the affiliates' programming discretion was under the
control of the networks.63 The investigation also considered
the issue of whether the networks, despite the previous action
of the FCC and Department of Justice, had continued to main-
tain anti-competitive policies. 4
The inquiry was prompted, in part, by a petition submitted to
the Commission by Westinghouse Broadcasting Company call-
ing for a "comprehensive inquiry and rulemaking proceeding
to review the changing role and function of the three national
television networks."6 The antitrust cases filed against the
networks also played a role in the decision to begin another
study.66
In its 1978 Further Notice of Inquiry, the FCC stated that it
was "centrally concerned about whether ... [certain network]
practices enable the existing major commercial networks, in
their relations with affiliates and program suppliers, to limit
the opportunities for others to compete for station broadcast
time and thereby exert an anti-competitive influence upon the
61. The NBC decree permitted the network to acquire and exercise the option to
reorder a series for a maximum of five years. CBS agreed to an "improved" provision
which allowed it to acquire and exercise such options for only four years but allowed
future options to be acquired after the initial network/producer agreement expired.
The ABC decree permitted a graduated increase in internal production during the sec-
ond five years of the 10-year restriction from 2.5 hours per week (the NBC decree limit)
to five hours per week. 2 Comments of CBS, Inc. app. B, 8-9 (Jan. 26, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as CBS Comments].
62. In re Commercial Television Network Practices and the Ability of Station
Licensees to Serve the Public Interest, Notice of Inquiry, 62 F.C.C.2d 548 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Notice of Inquiry].
63. Id. at para. 2.
64. Id. at para. 3.
65. Id. at para. 4 (citing Westinghouse, Inc. Petition for Rule Making in Docket No.
RM-2749, 1, (Sept. 3, 1976)).
66. Id.
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industry's behavior."67 The Commission also considered possi-
ble structural remedies which might alleviate problems cre-
ated by the three-network system.68
1. Network Inquiry Special Staff Report
In 1980, the Network Inquiry Special Staff, which was created
in response to the 1977 Notice of Inquiry,69 released its final
report.70 Although the FCC considers the recommendations of
the Staff as merely advisory, the Staff's Final Report was per-
haps the most influential factor underlying the Commission's
tentative repeal of the rules. 71
Many of the Staff's initial findings directly contradicted the
FCC's assumptions that justified the financial interest and syn-
dication rules.7 2 For example, the Staff contended that the mar-
ket for syndicated programs was competitive before the rules
were imposed.73 Thus the networks did not, in its view, operate
anti-competitively by taking advantage of financial interest or
syndication rights they had acquired. The Staff also explained
that the rules might interfere with "an efficient risk-sharing ar-
rangement between the networks and their program sup-
plies. '7 4 This argument, which was also emphasized by the
networks in their lobbying campaign against the rules, 75 is
based on the assumption that, if the networks are permitted to
67. In re Commercial Television Network Practices, Further Notice of Inquiry, 69
F.C.C.2d 1524, para. 18 (1978).
68. Id. at para. 21.
69. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 62.
70. FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL REPORT: NEW TELEVISION NET-
WORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION (1980) [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT].
71. "The Commission has never expressly endorsed or rejected the conclusions or
recommendations of the Network Inquiry Special Staff. However, having noted the
staff's conclusions.., we instituted the present rule making proceeding. Tenta-
tive Decision, supra note 5, at para. 22.
72. FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at IV-79. See also BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra
note 5, at 784-95.
73. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 21. The CPD contends that the net-
works did not take advantage of their ability to negotiate for financial or syndication
rights because the marketplace prior to adoption of the rules was significantly different
from that which exists today. Specifically, very few independent stations were in oper-
ation at the time. Thus the value of off-network programs and the competitive impact
of the independents on the networks were minimal. The CPD asserts that, as a result,
the networks had little motivation to become involved in syndication. CPD Comments,
supra note 4, at 126-28.
74. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 21.
75. See CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 122-32.
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acquire financial interests and syndication rights in programs,
they will share the great financial risks involved in program
production. Under the rules, these risks are shouldered almost
entirely by the independent producers.7 6 As a result of the
risks which must be borne by independent producers, the Staff
asserted that the program production industry has become
concentrated in the hands of a few large independent produ-
cers and studios.77
Among the Staff's conclusions was its assertion that the
rules were unnecessary when adopted and could not achieve
their intended purposes. 78 The Staff recommended either
drastic modification of the rules or complete repeal. The Staff
explained:
[Our analysis shows that the Commission's regulation of pro-
gram supply has largely failed to achieve the Commission's
stated objectives. The financial interest and syndication rules
can only be characterized as misguided at best .... The rules
have done little to further the Commission's goals of diversity
or increased competition in the program supply market.7 9
Much of the Staff's argument is based on its view of the im-
pact of new video alternatives such as cable:80
The very appearance of new viewer options through an in-
crease in the number of full-time networks, whether employing
conventional or unconventional technology, mitigates the con-
cerns expressed by the Commission in the promulgation of
these rules .... Whatever "dominance" the three commercial
networks possess in the network and syndication markets will
automatically be reduced by the appearance of new
networks.81
The Staff went on to assert that "the objective of the financial
interest and syndication rules to reduce network market power
would be attained by the simple fact of an increase in the
number of networks. 82
76. FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at IV-79-80.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cable television systems distribute original and broadcast television program-
ming over wired networks. Basic cable service refers to a package of cable channels
which are provided to the consumer at a set fee. Pay cable refers to channels such as
HBO and Showtime which, for an additional fee, provide recent theatrical movies and
some original programming. A Fifth Estate Glossary, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 75.
81. FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at IV-84-85.
82. Id. at 85.
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In recommending modification or repeal, the Staff also con-
sidered the feasibility of regulating individual contract terms
between the networks and independent producers in order to
control the networks' market power.8 3 Such regulation, the
Staff concluded, would not be advisable "[b]ecause a regula-
tion of one or a few contract terms does not alter the number or
identity of network firms, or the structure of the market within
which they operate."84 The Staff explained that, because of the
existing three-network market structure, the bargaining posi-
tion of the networks would enable them "to frustrate the regu-
lation's compensatory purpose by altering other terms of the
agreement to regain their advantage.""
In short, the Staff recommended regulation through deregu-
lation by advocating the "eroding forces of competition rather
than the ad hoc reactions of the FCC."86 Such a recommenda-
tion, however, appears contradictory in light of the Staff's rec-
ognition of the continuing market power of the three national
networks and their ability to circumvent possible FCC at-
tempts at regulating contract terms. 87 While the Staff correctly
concludes that the current three-network structure assures
network dominance, it also appears to assert that the networks
should be allowed to acquire even more power and financial
strength.8
2. Tentative Repeal of the Rules
In June, 1982, the Commission proposed that the existing
rules be repealed. 9 Among its major reasons for repeal was
the argument, based on the findings of the FCC Network In-
quiry Special Staff, that present market conditions and the
emergence of new video technologies will provide sufficient
competition for the networks and restrict the possibility of net-
work dominance.90 The FCC pointed to cable television,9 over-
the-air pay television,92 video cassette and video disc players,93
83. Id. at 95.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 96.
87. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying note 79.
89. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7, at paras. 32-42.
90. Id. at para. 38.
91. See supra note 80.
92. Also known as subscription television (STV), over the air pay television refers
to the transmission of scrambled signals over the air to subscribers who pay a fee for a
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and two emerging technologies, Multipoint Distribution Serv-
ices (MDS) 94 and Direct Broadcasting Satellites (DBS),95 as
providing the networks' present and future competition. 6
In addition, the Commission also took into consideration a
three-year decline in network audience shares from eighty-
eight percent in 1979 to eighty-one percent in 1981 and a drop in
network income from $406.1 million in 1977 to $325.6 million in
1980. 97 In proposing repeal, the Commission enunciated its de-
veloping policy of regulation through deregulation and the val-
signal decoder, which is attached to the subscriber's television set and allows
unimpaired reception of the STV signal. A Fifth Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 76.
93. A video cassette recorder (VCR) is "a TV attachment that can record programs
off the air for later viewing, and play prerecorded video cassettes." Glossary, CHAN-
NELS FIELD GUIDE '84, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 67. A video disc player is a device, resembling
a phonograph, which reads and displays images stored on special discs. "The images
are encoded in microscopic 'pits,' which are embedded in the disc's surface and pro-
tected by a hard coating. A low-power laser beam is reflected onto those pits, and then
interpreted, to produce a video image .... The laser provides an extremely high-
quality image, and never wears the disc down, as a stylus would, by direct contact."
Optical Disc: A Technology in Search of A Niche, CHANNELS FIELD GUIDE '84, Nov.-Dec.
1983, at 45. A major drawback of the video disc player is its inability to record pro-
grams. Id.
94. An MDS system uses omnidirectional microwave signals ... to transmit
video, or other services, to subscribers .... Although some hold hope that
MDS will offer an alternative to cable TV, MDS suffers from obvious competi-
tive disadvantages. First, MDS customer antennas must be within line-of-
sight of the transmitter, a factor which can limit the number of customers an
MDS service can reach. FCC rules also currently allocate only two MDS chan-
nels to a market-and in effect permit an individual operator to control only
one of them-thereby limiting MDS operators to one-channel services.
A Fifth Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 76.
95. A direct broadcasting satellite is a radio relay station which receives:
video, audio, data and other transmissions from uplinks on the earth, then re-
transmits them to downlinks on the ground.
Communications satellites are launched into positions 22,300 feet above the
equator, where they orbit the earth at the same speed the earth is rotating,
giving them the appearance of remaining stationary....
DBS satellites work basically the same way as the current generation of
communications satellites-they receive signals from earth and retransmit
them back to the ground. However, since they operate with higher power,
their signals can be received with much smaller, and therefore much more
affordable, earth stations.
Id. at 75. DBS thus allows the direct transmission of video signals from satellites to
the viewer's home. Id.
96. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7, at paras. 34-37.
97. Id. at para. 38. Recent reports indicate, however, that the networks are now
enjoying healthy sales: "In what is being described as some of the most ferocious sales
activity in recent years, both agency buyers and network sales people are reporting an
unseasonably strong first quarter." First Quarter TV Network Sales Off to a Roaring
Start, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1984, at 41.
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ues of "unfettered competition."98 The Commission concluded:
[T]he market for television programming has undergone sig-
nificant change since adoption of the syndication and financial
interest rule. Over the past few years, the rate of technological
change in television program service has increased in a fashion
which could not have been anticipated by us a decade ago. In
addition, the pacer [sic] appears to be increasing with no peak
in sight. Therefore, our concern over the abilities of the net-
works to act as monopsonists 99 in the purchase of television
programming may no longer be justified.100
It is important to note that, while voting for the Commis-
sion's proposed repeal, Commissioners Rivera and Quello, in
separate concurring statements, voiced their doubts as to the
majority's view of the competitive impact of new video sources
on the networks. 10
On August 12, 1983, the Commission, after reviewing numer-
ous comments and the oral testimony of interested parties, re-
leased its tentative decision to repeal the rules.0 2 It did not
finalize the decision but instead solicited additional comments
on the action. 0 3
The form of the tentative repeal departs slightly from the
Commission's original proposal and has been labelled the
"Fowler Compromise" by opponents.104 In short, the FCC de-
cided to eliminate the financial interest rule, thus allowing the
networks "passive" financial interests in independently pro-
duced programs.105 The Commission compromised, however,
with respect to the syndication rule and decided to narrow the
existing prohibition against network involvement in domestic
98. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7, at paras. 32-42.
99. Monopsony is "[a] condition of the market in which there is but one buyer for
a particular commodity." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 908 (5th ed. 1979).
100. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7, at para. 32.
101. Id. at 32,967. For a further discussion of the commissioners' views, see gener-
ally infra notes 171-204 and accompanying text.
102. Tentative Decision, supra note 5.
103. Id. at para. 14.
104. Networks Win Financial Interes4 Syndication Battle, supra note 10, at 28.
105. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 14. A "passive" financial interest is
one which would not lead to active management or control. The Commission ex-
plained, "[IIt is not uncommon in the entertainment world to separate passive profit
sharing interests from interests that involve active management control and we see no
reason why a similar type of separation cannot be used effectively to further our objec-
tives here." Id. Yet it appears that the Commission puts no limit on the financial in-
terests networks can acquire. Thus, the use of the "passive" qualification appears to
be merely precatory. Id.
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syndication to include only prime-time entertainment series. 0 6
This compromise to modify rather than repeal the rules re-
sulted primarily from pressure by independent television sta-
tions. They feared that if networks could control syndication
of off-network prime-time series "reruns," the life blood of the
independent station, then the networks could restrict the in-
dependents' access to popular shows, a practice known as
"warehousing." Such action might allow the networks to cir-
cumvent the increasingly damaging competition offered by the
independents. °7
The tentative repeal of the rules also included a "sunset"
provision which would become effective in 1990 and would
eliminate the remaining restrictions on network participation
in syndication.108 Commissioners Quello and Rivera again is-
sued separate statements in response to the majority deci-
sion.109 Quello expressed a concern for the continued health of
independent television stations and solicited comments on this
issue." ' Rivera dissented to the 1990 "sunset" provision, calling
it "nothing more than a 'guesstimate' of future competition" in
the video industry."'
106. Id. at para. 203. Pursuant to the tentative decision, the Commission explained:
[A] network will be required, within six months of a series completing its net-
work exhibition run, to transfer all rights in that series it may hold relating to
its syndication, to an unaffiliated syndicator. In addition, no later than the end
of the fifth year of a network series run, the network will have to transfer all
syndication rights for programs in that series to an unaffiliated syndicator.
Id. at para. 204.
107. Id. at para. 203. Opponents of the tentative repeal claim that even with the
modification, warehousing is still possible. Under the modification, the networks
would be permitted to enter the first-run syndication business and to syndi-
cate non-prime-time programs, "mini-series" and made-for-television and the-
atrical movies; and, they would be permitted to take unlimited financial
interests in programs produced by others with only precatory admonitions as
to the exercise of power that possession of such interests confers. Most impor-
tantly, the networks would be permitted to choose the syndicator of even
those programs which they may not syndicate themselves, while continuing to
hold controlling financial interests in those programs.
Comments of the Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc. on Tentative
Decision 25-26 (Sept. 20, 1983).
108. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 209.
109. Id. at 38,053.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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III
The Present Video Marketplace and the Paradox
of Deregulation
As noted above, the networks have suffered somewhat from
the competition of such video sources as cable television." 2
They argue that as a result of this competition, their audience
share and their program purchasing power-their ability to bid
competitively for new programs-have been eroded." 3 Both
the Network Inquiry Special Staff and the FCC accepted this
assertion in their respective proposals for repeal of the rules."4
Nevertheless, the competition presently offered by new
video technologies is not sufficient to counter the dominance of
the networks."5 Repeal of the rules in the context of the pres-
ent and projected television marketplace would therefore
achieve a paradoxical result in allowing the networks to solid-
ify their position as dominant participants in the home en-
tertainment industry, while at the same time weakening the
power of independent producers who have served as a partial
check to network dominance." 6 To illustrate this paradox, it is
112. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
113. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 113. In re Amendment of 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658(j), The Syndication and Financial Interest Rule, Reply Comment of CBS, Inc.
in BC Docket No. 82-345, at Vol. I, A-3 (Apr. 26, 1983). [hereinafter cited as CBS Reply
Comments].
114. See supra notes 70-111 and accompanying text. The FCC asserted:
[C I ompetitors have made significant inroads into the broadcast networks' po-
sition .... [TIhe growth of these other services has eroded the networks'
share of the video audience to 80 percent. Even more telling is the decline in
the proportion of video product purchased by the networks . . .which has
fallen from 74 percent to 54 percent since adoption of the rules. The purchas-
ing power of the other video media has, thus, grown substantially.
Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 179. The CPD challenged the FCC's use of
the above statistics, which were formulated by CBS, concerning the proportion of
video product purchased by the networks. The CPD claimed that although only prime-
time programs are at a issue, CBS, in its analysis, failed to subtract certain nonprime-
time programming expenditures including those for theatrical movies, sports events
and specials. Thus, the CPD concluded that "the vast majority of expenditures for the
programs at issue here are by the networks . . . [and the situation] is not likely to
change in the near future." Comments of the CPD on the Tentative Decision 83 (Sept.
20, 1983).
115. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 20-32. See also Brown, Perspective:
Beyond Boom & Bust, CHANNELS FIELD GUmE '84, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 5.
116. In a speech before the National Press Club, independent producer Norman
Lear discussed the continuing battle between independent producers and the net-
works. Lear outlined some of the problems he encountered in the production of "All in
the Family:" "[The networks] fought my doing stories on the subjects of homosexual-
ity, Vietnam, the Jewish Defense League, impotence, dozens of others - and they
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necessary to analyze individually the impact of several video
competitors on the networks' hold of the home entertainment
industry and to consider the future of the video marketplace in
light of the eventual emergence of new competitors.
A. Cable Television
One of the networks' more successful competitors in recent
years has been the cable television industry."7 While it is true
that over the last twelve years cable television has made dra-
matic advances, cable has not drawn a substantial audience
away from the networks." 8 The CPD reports that "as of Febru-
ary 1983, cable passed less than 60 percent of all television
homes and was connected in less than 35 percent of all televi-
sion homes."" 9 In addition, only twenty percent, approxi-
mately, of television homes subscribe to a pay cable service. 2 °
Network television executives in fact admit that ratings on
cable are not yet sufficient to alter their programming
decisions.
121
Although the cable television industry will continue to grow,
flatly refused to have us photograph Archie Bunker diapering his infant grandson.
Frontal nudity, they called it." Address by Norman Lear, National Press Club 9 (Sept.
21, 1983). Lear concluded that there is a "need for this battle to continue ....
[D Iiminish the effect and the strength of the independent writer/creator and the bat-
tle is over. It is in the public interest that that battle never be over." Id. at 33.
117. In 1970, there were only 2,490 cable systems which were connected to nine mil-
lion homes. In 1983, 4,825 cable systems provided service to 45 million homes. Tenta-
tive Decision, supra note 5, at para. 111. The FCC reports:
[A] wide variety of cable networks has come into being since the mid-1970's.
Many of these networks are highly specialized, offering only news, sports, chil-
dren's or cultural programs. Of the 34 basic service networks, 23 are adver-
tiser-supported, including 3 independent stations, WTBS, WGN and WOR,
which are distributed nationally via satellite and cable and often called super-
stations. Another 11 networks are supported directly or indirectly by sub-
scriber fees. Cable systems also carry pay-cable channels in addition to the
basic programming. The 17 currently available pay networks include movie
channels, adult entertainment and regional sports channels. The largest pay
cable networks are HBO and Showtime, which began principally as movie
channels but have expanded their offerings to include original programming.
Id. at para. 113. See also CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 53-71.
118. In 1981, cable-originated and pay-cable programming accumulated only a 3.3%
average audience prime time share of composite television households. The network
share was 81%. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 63 (citing Nielsen Cable TV Index,
Nov. 1981).
119. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 22 (citing Communications Daily, Apr.
6, 1983, at 5).
120. Id. at 22-23 (citing CABLEVISION, Apr. 4, 1983, at 143).
121. Id. at 23.
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the future video marketplace is likely to be quite similar to that
which exists today.'22 As the CPD explains, "In 1990, fully 40
percent or more of the population will not subscribe to any
new media, including cable."'123 In addition, "[play cable will
have an audience share of under 10 percent in 1990. '124
The networks assert that cable television is now a serious
competitor in the television industry. 2 In their analysis, they
point to the tremendous growth in the number of cable sys-
tems and the increase in cable revenues.'26 CBS, for example,
provided graphs illustrating the geometric gains which cable
has enjoyed.'27 Yet, CBS's analysis fails to mention an impor-
tant consideration: before 1970, cable systems were virtually
nonexistent. 128 Thus, the recent growth of cable systems, when
plotted on a graph, will reflect an impressive rising slope. CBS
and the other networks do not emphasize cable's compara-
tively low ratings in light of the networks' approximately
eighty percent audience share.129 As a result, consideration of
the admittedly rapid emergence of cable as a serious competi-
tor to network television is both inappropriate and premature.
B. New Video Technologies As Competitors
CBS contends that certain other existing or developing tech-
nologies provide or will provide serious competition for the
three networks. 3 ° Included among these competitors are
MDS,131 Low Power Television (LPTV) ,132 DBS,133 Subscrip-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 53-71.
126. CBS reports that basic cable revenues have climbed from $878 million in 1975
to $2.58 billion in 1982. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 61. Pay cable revenues rose
from $41.1 million in 1976 to $1.739 billion in 1982. Id. at 66.
127. Id. at 62-63, 67.
128. Originally, cable systems were used to bring regular broadcast services to rural
areas which could not be reached by the standard broadcast signal. Demand for cable
services accelerated only after Time, Inc.'s Home Box Office (HBO) leased a channel
on RCA's Satcom 1 (satellite) in order to distribute pay-cable programming. A Fifth
Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 75.
129. See supra note 118.
130. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 72-94.
131. See supra note 94.
132. LPTV refers to low-power television stations that previously were only used
for the retransmission of full-power signals in rural or remote areas which could not
receive the full-power signals directly. The role of LPTV has recently been "expanded
to include program origination and sale of advertising or subscription services." CBS
Comments, supra note 61, at 85.
[Vol. 6
No. 3] PARADOXES OF THE PROPOSED RULES
tion Television (STV), 34 Satellite Master Antenna Television
(SMATV),'3 video cassette players, and video disc players.'36
At present, however, the impact of these new media as net-
work competitors is minimal. 37 In fact, systems such as DBS
will not be operational until 1986.138 As far as the other new
entrants outlined by CBS are concerned, MDS is now available
to less than one percent of the public; STV, available only in
about twenty markets, is generally unprofitable; and LPTV is
still in its infancy stage. 39 In addition, only 2.1 million homes,
or 2.6% of all households, have video cassette players, and only
300,000 households have video disc players.
40
Clearly, the competitive effect of these new media alterna-
tives is minimal, and any effects of future systems are purely
speculative. In fact, many new media have proven to be busi-
ness failures in the face of network competition.1
133. See supra note 95.
134. See supra note 92.
135. Satellite Master Antenna Systems (SMATV) . . .[are] cloned from cable
systems, look like cable systems, and in most cases, are operated like them.
The essential difference is that SMATV systems operate on private property-
apartment buildings, condominium complexes, or even private housing devel-
opments and mobile home parks. Instead of getting a franchise (the right to
string or bury wire along city streets and rights of way) from local govern-
ments, SMATV operators sign contracts with the property owners, allowing
them to bring cable television into the homes on the property.
In most cases, that's done by hooking up an earth station aimed at Satcom
III-R-the RCA Americom satellite carrying the bulk of cable programming-
to a multi-unit building's master antenna .... One advantage SMATV opera-
tors have over their cable counterparts is that they are free from regulation.
Because they don't need a municipal franchise, they aren't burdened with the
local regulations that accompany a municipal grant.
A Fifth Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 76.
136. See supra note 93.
137. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 24.
138. Id. at 24-25.
139. Id.
140. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 116.
141. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 26. The STV industry, in particular, is
experiencing great difficulties. Although at one time STV boasted 1.5 million subscrib-
ers, the industry has since lost 400,000 subscribers, and nine STV stations have shut
down. Major STV companies have posted substantial losses. United Cable, for exam-
ple, which owned three STV stations, wrote them off as a $33 million loss and put them
up for sale. Peter Falco of Merrill Lynch stated that "STV is bordering on comatose."
Talen, STV: Going, Going .... CHANNELS FIELD GUIDE '84, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 33. MDS
is not faring much better than STV. The number of MDS subscribers reportedly has
"stagnated" at 500,000. STV, MDS Industries Reassess Market Position at Joint Conven-
tion, BROADCASTING, Nov. 7, 1983, at 68. Cable television, perhaps the most viable net-
work competitor, is also struggling to stay profitable. Warner Amex Cable, a major
COMM/ENT L. J.
C. Network Investment in New Media
A major paradox of the current controversy over the rules is
the fact that while the networks argue that competition from
emerging media sources is eroding or will erode their audience
share and purchasing power, each network has, at the same
time, invested heavily in such new technology. 142
The CPD outlined certain examples of the networks' partici-
pation in new technology. 43 For example, ABC was involved
as a partner in the ill-fated American Repertory Television
Service (ARTS), a cable television service.1' ABC and Sony
plan to distribute subscription television programs designed to
be recorded on VCRs 145 during late night hours. 46 ABC is in-
volved in other cable services including the Satellite News
Channel and a "pay-per-view" sports channel called RSVP.1
47
In addition, ABC is now marketing programs for video cas-
settes, video discs, and cable services. 48
CBS involvement in new media is expanding as well. 49 For
example, the network plans to launch a DBS 50 service and is a
partner with AT&T in the developing videotext 5' market. In
cooperation with Home Box Office, Inc. (HBO), a chief cable
television rival, and Columbia Pictures, CBS plans to produce
and distribute programming for pay-cable systems. 52 CBS is
also involved in the development of MDS13 facilities and
manufactures video discs. 5
4
cable company, posted a $47 million loss in 1982. Stoller, Cable Industry: End of the
Gold Rush, CHANNELS FIELD GUIDE '84, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 26.
142. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 29.
143. Id. at 29-32.
144. Id. at 29-30.
145. See supra note 93.
146. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 30.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 30-31.
150. See supra note 95.
151. Videotext is a two-way interactive service that uses either two-way cable
or telephone lines to connect a central computer to a television screen thereby
permitting a user to retrieve all sorts of information and to conduct actual
transactions....
Although videotext promises to be more expensive than teletext-and
therefore may not be as widely used as teletext-its interactive capability
would seem to make it the service of first choice.
A Fifth Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 76. See also infra note 181.
152. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 31.
153. See supra note 94.
154. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 31. See supra note 93.
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RCA, the parent corporation of NBC, produces video discs
and video disc players and also plans to start a DBS service.'55
RCA's involvement extends into the videotext'56 market, and
its satellites 57 now deliver "most satellite-distributed pro-
gramming to cable, SMATV 58 and MDS159 systems."' 60
Although the competitive impact of new technology is not
yet significant,161 the CPD correctly observes that "[ilf and
when the new media become competitive with the networks
for audiences, series programming and advertising revenue,
the networks, through their increasingly significant holdings in
the new technology, can only gain, not lose.' 62
D. Independent Television Stations
Both sides to the present controversy agree that independ-
ent television stations, i.e., over-the-air broadcast facilities
which are not affiliated with one of the three major networks,
have flourished during the last decade. 63 The number of in-
dependent stations has risen from seventy-seven in 1970, to 179
in 1982.16 The parties do not, however, agree on the reasons
for the independents' success. CBS contends that such suc-
cess is unrelated to the FCC rules and based primarily upon
"the improved technical and economic performance of UHF
stations vis-a-vis VHF stations.' ' 65 CBS points out that eighty-
five percent of the independent commercial television stations
utilize the UHF band and thus have benefitted from such im-
proved performance. 6 6 The CPD contends that the independ-
ents' success is based on their "free access to the most popular
and recent off-network programs," the prime-time entertain-
155. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 31. See supra note 95.
156. See supra note 151.
157. See supra note 95.
158. See supra note 135.
159. See supra note 94.
160. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 31.
161. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
162. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 32. See also Brown, Are the Networks
Dinosaurs?, CHANNELS, June/July, at 26. Brown asserts that, "evidence is accumulat-
ing that the old business of network television-the business of webs, affiliates, and
nightly schedules-is inexorably in decline. The old business, that beautiful business,
is the dinosaur. The companies we call the networks, however, are well equipped to
survive and flourish in the new environment." Id. at 57.
163. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 72; CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 53.
164. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 72.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 75.
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ment series. 167
Regardless of the reasons for the independents' success, the
impact of independent television stations on the networks' au-
dience share remains insubstantial. In 1982, network affiliates
held a seventy-nine percent prime time share within the top
twenty markets.'68 Independent stations held only an eleven
percent share of the audience in these same markets. 169 The
CPD explained that, while independents have nearly doubled
their share of the total television revenues from 12.7 percent in
1970, to approximately 23.2 percent in 1982, "[t]his is not to im-
ply that independent stations are overtaking network affiliates
in viewership, revenues or profits.' 7 °
IV
The Road to 1990171
Although the networks argue that new technology now offers
serious competition, audience-share projections for the year
1990 undertaken by the networks predict that they will main-
tain audience shares as high as seventy percent. 72 CBS con-
tends that "audience share data do not provide a valid
measurement of the relative strength of the networks."'' 7
167. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 56-58.
168. Id. at 59 (citing Nielsen Source Index Feb. 1979 and Feb. 1982).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 58. Based on the success of independent television stations, CBS con-
tends that the structure of the television industry was not "frozen" by the FCC's 1952
allocation and that a fourth network is still possible. To illustrate this point, CBS out-
lines Metromedia Inc.'s plans to establish a network by joining its seven owned sta-
tions with other independent and network affiliated stations. At the heart of
Metromedia's plans was the syndication of a 90-minute late night talk show called
"Thicke of the Night" starring Alan Thicke. The show was designed to compete with
the "Tonight Show" starring Johnny Carson, the established network standard. CBS
quotes Metromedia President Robert Bennett as stating, "Alan Thicke is the beginning
of the fourth network." CBS Reply Comments, supra note 113, at exhibit A-10. Consid-
ering the relatively poor showing of 'Thicke of the Night" when pitted against Johnny
Carson, it is evident that Alan Thicke may be the end of Metromedia's hopes for a
fourth network as well. Although the show started off strongly in the ratings, its popu-
larity was short-lived. Syndicated Shakeout Follows November Sweeps, BROADCAST-
ING, Jan. 9, 1984, at 46. In fact, the show recently was cancelled.
171. 'The Road to 1990" is also the title of a 1982 CBS/Broadcast Group report
which is often cited by the CPD as evidence of the network's admission that network
dominance will continue into 1990. The report predicts that the networks will hold a
1990 prime-time audience share of 70%, while pay cable will hold an 11% share. CPD
Comments, supra note 4, at 74.
172. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 115.
173. CBS Reply Comments, supra note 113, at A-5.
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What is important, the network argues, is the relative purchas-
ing power of the networks, their ability to bid for new pro-
grams. 74 The CPD points out, however, that new media do not
compete with the networks to obtain "prime time quality se-
ries programming" and that "very few of the services offering
programming to cable systems are even considering the
purchase of the types of series which networks routinely
purchase.' 75 In addition, services which do consider purchas-
ing such programs are still unable to offer the amount of
money which the networks are willing to pay. 76
The CPD explains that another reason prevents program
producers from looking to new media as prospective program
purchasers: "Series attain value in the syndication market
only through network exposure. Programs exhibited on pay
cable are seen by too few persons to create, through public fa-
miliarity, the kinds of syndication values which off-network
shows possess. '" 77
Although the networks express concerns about competition
from new media in an attempt to lend support to arguments in
favor of repeal,178 in other forums, the networks appear confi-
dent that their dominance in the industry will last into the
1990's.171 In their concurring statements to the FCC's 1982 No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making,180 Commissioners Quello and
Rivera commented on this apparent contradiction. Quello, for
example, expressed a concern that "it may be too early to con-
clude that the technological inroads of cable, teletext,'81 low
power TV, 82 MDS 83 and STV 8 4 have significantly diluted net-
174. Id. at A-6.
175. CPD Reply Comments, supra note 8, at 26.
176. Id. at 27.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
179. See upra note 171.
180. Supra note 7, at 32,967.
181. Teletext is a one-way electronic publishing service that can be transmitted
over ... a standard television signal or the full channel of a television station
or cable television system .... Most teletext technologies permit users to
access a broad variety of information-stock quotes, news headlines, horo-
scopes, classified ads-through the use of some sort of keypad. One advantage
teletext has over traditional print media is that it can be updated at any time.
Although some cable operators are already offering teletext service commer-
cially, broadcasters are only offering it experimentally, awaiting approval from
the FCC.
A Fifth Estate Glossary, supra note 80, at 76.
182. See supra note 132.
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work dominance." '185 Quello quotes the President of NBC as
stating to NBC affiliates that commercial television networks
"will remain the dominant communications medium of the fu-
ture .... [T]he future is not passing us by. The future is ours
to take."'86 The President of CBS is also quoted in a similar
speech:
I am increasingly convinced that there is less change on the
horizon than most are predicting. That is a theme that may
sound a little different [these days]. I suggest that [changes in
the media universe] will be not as large, not as threatening and
not as soon as most predict.'87
Commissioner Rivera echoed Quello's concerns in his state-
ment that, "[T] he mere existence of some additional competi-
tion for viewers does not mean that the dominant players no
longer can exercise undue leverage in program procure-
ment .... [TIhe three networks are still the most pervasive
television programming outlets; no other entity even ap-
proaches their audience levels or buying power."188
A. Independent Producers As an Economic and Political Force
The networks argue that one result of the rules has been a
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few in-
dependent producers.'89 CBS contends that the number of
producers supplying prime-time programming dropped from
sixty to forty-one between 1968 and 1981.190 Although CPD data
suggests an increase in the number of producers as a result of
the rules, 9 ' both sides agree that several individual producers
183. See supra note 94.
184. See supra note 92.
185. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 7, at 32,967.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. CBS Comments, supra note 61, at 146.
The brunt of the burden that the rules create, moreover, must fall on the most
risky programs and the most risky producers, both distorting the response of
the program marketplace to viewer program preferences and increasing the
concentration of network program supply.
The rules clearly tend to increase barriers to entry [of the program produc-
tion business] and favor larger over smaller producers.
Id.
190. Id. at 147. CBS actually cites the same data as the Network Inquiry Special
Staff. See also BACKGROUND REPORTS, supra note 5, at 571.
191. The CPD claims the number of suppliers has increased from 61 in 1969-1970 to
67 in 1981-1982. Tentative Decision, supra note 5, at para. 140. The reason CBS and the
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have become financially stronger since the rules' adoption. 192
As demonstrated above, the FCC Special Staff recognized
the ability of the networks, as a result of the existing market
structure, to circumvent attempts at regulation despite the pro-
ducers' strength.1 93 Network bargaining power is also evident
in the fact that producers, even under the rules, are still forced
to give up much of their creative control over programs to the
networks as a condition of exhibition. 94
Based on these two observations, it is clear that the net-
works are able to maintain an overwhelming bargaining posi-
tion even under the existing rules. Thus, the major success of
the rules has not been in a dramatic decrease of network
power, but in a dramatic increase in the power of the in-
dependent producer. The rules have led to the financial
strength of a group of independent producers who serve as a
check and balance against the networks' continuing domi-
nance of the industry.1 95 Instead of one strong voice, two now
CPD reached different conclusions as to the concentration of the program supply mar-
ketplace is
that each used a different definition of producer. CBS simply counted the
number of entities who had contracted with a network for the production or
delivery of a program. [The] CPD counted all those who had management
and/or creative responsibility or a financial interest in the proceeds from first-
run exhibition.
Id. at para. 141.
192. CPD Comments, supra note 4, at 67-68. See generally CBS Comments, supra
note 61, at 142-56.
193. See supra notes 83-86.
194. The Caucus for Producers, Writers and Directors, a group which is also in-
volved in the present controversy surrounding the rules, claims that the networks
force producers to "violate their contracts with the craft unions with respect to creative
control over a program" by requiring the transfer of much creative power to the net-
works. Tentative Decision, s-upra note 5, at para. 36. In fact, many independent produ-
cers apparently exercised more creative control over programs in 1966 than they do
today. The following clauses from 1966 and 1983 ABC producer/network contracts
demonstrate this observation:
1966: Producer shall have full creative control of all entertainment elements
and the production of each film. We (ABC) shall have the right to consult with
you with regard thereto, but the final decision shall be in you.
1983: ABC shall have approval of all major creative elements of the Movie-for-
Television including, but not limited to: producer, director, cinematographer,
script, cast, casting director, title, composer, screen credits and publicity relat-
ing to the Movie-for-Television issued by or under packagers' control and any
substitutes for any of the foregoing.
O'Flaherty, Who's to Design TV-Creators or Salesmen?, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 22,
1983, at 34, col. 1.
195. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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exist. Such a result is desirable in light of the general federal
policy encouraging diversity and competition.
The strength of independent producers is nowhere more evi-
dent than in the nature and extent of the controversy sur-
rounding the tentative repeal of the rules. Led by the CPD,
independent producers and others have elevated the issue of
repeal to national prominence. 196 Clearly, the financial
strength of the independent production community has led to
political strength and, as a result, has advanced the long-
sought goal of diversity by assuring a multiplicity of forces
within the home entertainment industry.
B. The Final Paradox
The FCC Chairman, Mark Fowler, appointed by President
Reagan to spearhead a massive deregulation movement, is per-
haps the chief proponent of repeal and regulation through de-
regulation. 197 Fowler claims, "[T] he American entrepreneurial
spirit and the sense of adventure of our people are not dead.
Rather, they've been subjugated by decades of heavy-handed
and in some cases mindless government regulation. It seems
to me that the more we get out of the way the better it gets."' 9
Despite Fowler's position, the consensus in the FCC, the
Congress, and the Reagan administration has shifted to a posi-
tion favoring continued retention of the rules.19 9 President
Reagan's declaration of support for a two-year retention of the
196. Shales, Fear & Lobbying in TV Land Over Profits & FCC Rules, Wash. Post,
Mar. 23, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
[TJ he battle being waged in Washington over the rules is among the most pas-
sionate and extravagant in the history of American enterprise, with the net-
works and their colossal power on one side, and the producers fighting,
sometimes for their very economic lives, on the other. East (New York, where
the network corporate headquarters are) is meeting West (Hollywood, where
the producers are) the way Ali met Frazier.
Id.
197. Networks Win Financial Interest, Syndication Battle, supra note 10, at 28.
198. Id.
199. Ganging Up on the Networks Re Fin-Syn, supra note 11, at 31. The President's
position was revealed to Congress in a letter from presidential aide Edwin Meese to
Senator Pete Wilson (R-Cal.). In the letter, Meese explained:
[T)he President has consistently favored government efforts to promote vigor-
ous competition; however, he has determined in this instance, in light of
changing market conditions in the television and program production indus-
tries, additional review of the consequences of repeal of the rule is neces-
sary.... [T]he President has decided to support a two-year legislatively-
mandated moratorium on any change in the syndication and financial interest
rule. A two-year moratorium would allow us to give the issue further study
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rules has effectively stalled the networks' and Fowler's cam-
paign to finalize the tentative repeal.2 °° In response to Reagan's
declaration, the Department of Justice, at one time in favor of
repeal, changed its position and now advocates retention.20 '
Facing mounting pressure as well as the threat of a legisla-
tive moratorium on any FCC attempts to finalize the tentative
repeal, Chairman Fowler announced that the Commission
would not take action on the repeal before May 10, 1984.202
Fowler stated that his decision was based on the "expressed
desire" to allow the networks and producers an opportunity to
settle the controversy privately.
20 3
Considering the President's connections with Hollywood
and the production industry, it is not surprising that he would
side with independent producers who advocate retention.
What is surprising and a final paradox to the current contro-
versy is that a President, who was elected on a platform com-
mitted to government deregulation, would, based on his
experience and personal ties to the entertainment industry,
contradict a basic tenet of his administration.20 4
and monitor the future changes in the marketplace, while at the same time
ensuring continuing healthy competition within the industry.
Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Fowler Backs Down on Fin-Syn, BROADCASTING, Nov. 21, 1983, at 26. In return
for Fowler's self-imposed moratorium, key Senate members who had been considering
legislative action on the issue, agreed not to resume such a consideration until March
15, 1984 "and not even then unless it appears that one of the sides [either the networks
or producers] has negotiated 'in bad faith' or a final commission action is deemed 'un-
reasonable.'" Id. The legislative attempts at resolving the current controversy have
been rather confusing. Representative Henry Waxman originally introduced a bill
(H.R. 2250) providing for a five-year moratorium on any FCC action to finalize the ten-
tative repeal. In order to accommodate speedy approval of the bill, Waxman agreed to
amend it to provide for a six-month moratorium. The House Committee on Energy
and Commerce promptly approved the bill. Ganging Up on the Networks Re Fin-Syn,
supra note 11, at 31. H.R. 2250, in its amended form, was then passed by the full House.
Waxman has since introduced another five-year moratorium bill (H.R. 4260). Mean-
while, in the Senate, an amendment was attached successfully to an approved supple-
mental appropriations bill prohibiting FCC action on the rules for six months. A bill
introduced by Senator Pete Wilson (S. 1707), which was a companion bill to Waxman's
original H.R. 2250 calling for a five-year moratorium, is still pending. Id.
203. Fowler Backs Down on Fin-Syn, supra note 202, at 26. The negotiations have
since failed to produce any compromise agreement. Each of the networks, in turn,
walked away from the negotiating table, leaving resolution of the issues to the Con-
gress or the FCC. CBS Ends Talks In Bid to Share in Rerun Millions, San Francisco
Chron., Feb. 14, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
204. A report released by the House Oversight Subcommittee of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee criticized Reagan's action stating that it amounted to an
No. 3]
COMM/ENT L. J.
V
Conclusion
Those who advocate repeal of the financial interest and syn-
dication rules contend that competitive forces rather than gov-
ernment intervention should dictate" the structure of the
television industry. Such an analysis, however, assumes that a
competitively structured and unrestrained marketplace al-
ready exists. In its 1952 spectrum allocation, the FCC assured
the survival of only three national networks. Thus, a major as-
sumption underlying the free-market approach to regulation is
lacking. Even in the absence of government intervention, the
market will remain artificially constrained.
Proponents of repeal also point to new video sources as offer-
ing serious competition for the networks. Nevertheless, as
demonstrated above, new media sources, such as cable, have
yet to weaken the position of the three national television net-
works. Because network dominance is not effectively chal-
lenged by new media alternatives, repeal of the rules would
lead to the paradoxical result of a less diverse television indus-
try. The networks would be able to acquire even more finan-
cial strength through participation in syndication and
ownership, however passive, of financial interests in indepen-
dently produced programs. Such financial strength would be
acquired at the expense of independent producers who might
be forced to cede syndication and financial interests as a condi-
tion precedent to the exhibition of their programs.
Admittedly, the financial interest and syndication rules have
not served to decrease the power of the national networks. Yet
the rules have succeeded in expanding the power of another
force in the industry: the independent producers. Through in-
volvement in the syndication business and the ability to main-
tain complete financial ownership of programs, independent
producers have grown into an economic and political force.
The existence of these independent producers, who often act
improper intervention into the FCC's rulemaking process. The committee focused on
a private meeting between Chairman Fowler and President Reagan on September 28,
1983, six weeks before Fowler imposed a six-month moratorium on any FCC action to
finalize the tentative repeal. The report asserted that the President's action "was par-
ticularly unwise given the president's personal interest and the financial interest of his
friends in the rule-making proceedings." Both Fowler and the Reagan administration
deny any impropriety. Reagan Chided For FCC 'Intervention,' San Francisco Chron.,
Feb. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
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as a counterbalance to the networks' dominance, thus fosters
the long-sought goal of diversity.
In their negotiations with the networks, the producers ap-
peared willing to allow the networks to participate in syndica-
tion or acquire partial financial ownership of programs in
exchange for a share in the advertising revenues generated by
such programs. °5 Although the networks refused to relinquish
any advertising revenues, such a compromise would have
achieved many of the results sought by the FCC. The power of
the independent producer would be maintained through con-
tinued financial strength, yet the networks would be allowed to
enter the syndication business and acquire a financial stake in
independently produced programs.
The failure of the networks and producers to reach a negoti-
ated settlement suggests that the FCC or Congress may step in
to resolve the dispute. It is unlikely, however, that Congress
will allow the FCC to finalize the tentative repeal. The sub-
stantial impact of President Reagan's declaration of support
for retention of the rules combined with a Congressional con-
sensus also favoring retention support this projection. Al-
though "deregulation" is now considered politically
fashionable, Congress should continue to recognize the impor-
tance of the rules to the maintenance of diversity within
television.
In order to assure diversity, it is necessary to maintain the
existence of several countervailing forces within the industry.
Critics argue that with each new season of programs, the tele-
vision medium reaches new lows in baseness and tedium. Yet
independent producers contend that without~the rules the situ-
ation would be much worse. Producers point out that network
executives are guided by "commercial imperative '20 6 rather
than by any sense of artistic achievement or cultural advance-
ment. While independent producers are not blind to the profit
potential of television, they are more apt to attempt to diversify
programming by recognizing the medium's ability to educate
as well as entertain.
Considering the overwhelming power of television to shape
the attitudes and structural make-up of society, it is essential
that programming decisions be guided by something more
205. Clean Slate Time in Fin-Syn Talks, BROADCASTING, Dec. 19, 1983, at 42.
206. See Address by Norman Lear, supra note 116, at 6.
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than the "commercial imperative." Therefore, absent any net-
work/producer compromise, the present rules should be left
intact. Until new media sources are able to offer serious com-
petition for the national networks, diversity will be encouraged
only by the continued existence of more than one economic
and political force in the home entertainment industry.
